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Empirical evidence suggests that individual income is positively correlated with public support
for environmental protection.
1 Nevertheless, a theoretical explanation of this relationship has
been attracted little attention in the literature. In a tax competition framework Oates and
Schwab (1988) develop a static model in which individuals are distinguished in wage and
non-wage earners and the median voter takes decisions over a capital tax and a standard for
local environmental quality. If the decisive individual is a wage earner, she will choose a
negative capital tax and a higher environmental standard than the first-best optimal level. If
the decisive individual is a non wage-earner, she will clearly prefer a positive capital tax (for
redistributive reasons). However, whether the environmental standard is higher or lower than
the first-best optimum is not clear cut.
In this paper we explore the conditions which are needed to generate a negative
relationship between income inequality and environmental protection. By using general
preferences and technology, we show that, in a neighbourhood of no inequality, only non-
inferiority of consumption goods and of the environmental good is needed to achieve this
result. Our finding is robust to a class of models from a static model to an overlapping-
generations economy model. In a companion paper (Marsiliani and Renström, 2000b), we are
able to derive the same result globally but for specific preferences. In this paper, individuals
differ in income-earning abilities, and the decisive individual (median voter or median
candidate) implements her preferred policy choice over a pollution tax and a capital tax (used
for redistributive reasons), which is in turn influenced by her characteristics such as income-
earning ability.
The main finding is that there are two driving forces at work. First, environmental policy
results in loss of production possibilities. Different individuals evaluate the production loss
differently. Individuals with a higher marginal utility of consumption (the poorer ones) have
a lower marginal rate of substitution between environment and private consumption if
environment is a non-inferior good. Second, a poorer individual typically wishes to
redistribute (using tax instruments on income) from richer individuals. The redistribution
1 For example, Elliot et al. (1997) find that both socio-demographic and economic factors are influential for
individual support on environmental spending in the US, while Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) find that individual
income and the price of the environmental good can explain most of the variation in voting on environmental
policies in California.
1causes the consumption-possibilities frontier to move inwards (due to efficiency losses). In
such an equilibrium, if the environment is a normal good, the marginal rate of substitution
between environment and private consumption decreases (for all individuals).
The paper is organised as follows. The general model is introduced in section 2. In
section 3, the economic equilibrium is solved for. In section 4, individuals’ preferences over
taxation are characterised for the general case, in a neighbourhood of no inequality. Section
5 summarises and interprets the results.
2. THE ECONOMY
We will specify a general model that contains three different cases. The first case (case I) is
a static economy in which output is produced by labour and pollution. Labour and pollution
are taxed at possibly different rates, and the tax receipts are redistributed lump-sum to the
individuals. Individuals differ in time endowments. This implies that individuals with less
productive time will supply less labour (than those with more productive time) if consumption
is a normal good. There will then be a redistributive conflict, since the less endowed
individuals gain from taxation of labour. This is similar to the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model,
but augmented for pollution.
The second case (case II) is a sequence of two-period economies. Individuals live for two
periods, consuming in both periods, but only working when they are young. Generations of
different ages never co-exist. This is the same set-up used by Persson and Tabellini (1994),
but augmented to allow for pollution. The period-one good is produced by labour (exogenous
in supply), and the period-two good by capital (saved from the previous period) and pollution.
Taxes are levied on capital income and on pollution, and a lump-sum transfer is given when
the individuals are old.
The third case (case III) is an overlapping-generations economy (similar to Renström,
1996, but augmented for pollution). Output in each period is produced by labour (inelastically
supplied by the young), capital (supplied by the old), and pollution. The decision about taxes
is taken one period in advance (the young decide on taxes to be implemented when they are
old). Taxes are levied on capital income and on pollution, and the transfer is given to the old
generation.
In order to clearly understand how inequality may affect the pollution tax, we use a
general utility specification and a general (constant returns-to-scale) production technology.
2In this paper, we will only look at one situation: this is when inequality is marginally
increased from a situation with full equality.
2 Using general preferences and technologies to
derive global results makes the problem untractable.
Denote the two consumption goods (consumed by individual i)a sc1
i and c2
i, respectively.
The individual may transfer some of commodity 1 ( k1
i ) into commodity 2 at the after-tax
rate p. The individual has an endowment of commodity 1, w0
i, and receives a transfer of
commodity 2, S. In case (I) (the static model), c1
i is leisure, c2
i is consumption, k1
i is labour
supply, p is the after-tax wage, and w
i is the individual’s time endowment. In cases (II) and
(III) (the dynamic economy with and without separation across generations), c1
i and c2
i are
period 1 and 2 consumption respectively, k1
i is savings, p is the after-tax return on savings,
and w
i is period-1 labour income. We assume that w0
i=γ
iw0, and that the distribution of γ
i
(denoted Γ (γ
i)) is continuous and, for cases (II) and (III), stationary over time. Γ (γ
i) is also
normalised so that the average γ
i equals unity, and so that averages equals aggregates. We will
denote averages/aggregates by omitting superscript i.
Throughout we will make one separability assumption: the pollution externality enters the
individuals’ utility functions in a weakly separable way. This will make the individuals’
marginal rates of substitutions between private consumption units independent of the pollution
externality. This will make the private consumption decisions independent of pollution;
without such a separation, the problem becomes intractable and one would have to resort to
computation. The weak separability will not, however, make the individuals’ evaluation of the
environment independent of their private consumption, and, consequently, we may explore
this interaction in the analysis. We next state the assumptions made.
2.1 Assumptions
A1 Individuals’ preferences
We assume weak separability between private consumption and pollution
where V and u are strictly concave, and V1>0, V2<0, u1>0, u2>0.
(1)
2 This is analogous to the optimal-tax literature. A situation in which one solves for an optimal tax system, and
evaluates it at zero tax rates, is a situation in which one marginally introduces the second best from a first-best
situation (no taxes).
3A2 Individuals’ constraints
The individuals’ budget constraints are
(2) (3)
A3 Production
A large number of firms are operating under identical constant-returns-to-scale technologies.
Therefore aggregate production, yt, can be calculated as if there was a representative firm
employing the aggregate quantity of the factors supplied by the individuals, (k≡ ∫ k
idΓ (γ
i) and,
in case (III) (l≡ ∫ γ
i ldΓ (γ
i)), and the polluting factor.
3 For case (I) and (II)
(4a), and for case (III) . (4b)




The tax receipts are fully used for the lump-sum transfer
(5)
A5 Representative democracy
The tax rates, τ
k and τ
x, are determined by a majority-elected representative one period in
advance. We assume that one candidate of each type runs for office, and that candidacy is
costless.
3. ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, the individual and aggregate economic behaviour are solved for any given
arbitrary sequences of tax rates.
3.1 Individual economic behaviour
3 The polluting factor is provided at no cost. Thus, in absence of a government taxing or regulating it, this
factor would be used up until the satiation point.
4 Note that w0 is labour income in the previous period, and w is labour income earned by the next generation
to come.
4Maximisation of (1) subject to (2)-(3) gives the individuals’ optimal decision over k. The
first-order condition forms an implicit function





N1 is positive (negative) if c1 is a normal (inferior) consumption good, and N2 is positive
(negative) if c2 is a normal (inferior) consumption good. Furthermore, N1 + N2 =1, implying
that, at most, one of the goods can be inferior. We will see later what role the normality of
the private consumption goods plays in the analysis.
3.3 Firms’ behaviour
Firms take prices as given. Profit maximisation implies that the before-tax prices are given
by r=Fk (in cases (I), (II), and (III)), and w=Fl (in case (III)). Notice that in case (III), w is
the wage received by the next generation (the present generation receives w0, which is
labour’s marginal product in the previous period). The first-order condition for the use of
factor x, Fx(k,x,l)=τ
x, gives (aggregate/average) x as a function of (aggregate/average) k and
τ
x (and of l which, however, is fixed), with the following property
(13)
3.4 Government’s budget
The budget may alternatively be written as
We will define environmental strictness as the level of τ
x, which implies that if the
(14)
government operates an emissions standard, the strictness measure is the (equilibrium)
marginal product of pollution, Fx.
54. PREFERENCES OVER POLICY
We assume that policy will be chosen by a representative. In a political-economy framework
this individual would be the majority elected one. Since individuals differ in only one
dimension one can construct a median-voter equilibrium where the median individual cannot
lose against any other candidate.
5
In this paper we will not model the political equilibrium, we will just examine the
preferences of a hypothetical representative and see how her optimal choice changes as we
change the ability of this individual. We do so for the case in which a candidate is "close"
to the average. In this way we analyse a situation where we move from the first best (all
individuals being the same) to the second best. The aim is to understand the driving forces
behind inequality and environmental policy.
The problem of the decision maker i is to
(15)
The problem is written as if the individual was to choose x directly (for example, imposing
an emissions standard); however, it is just an equivalent representation of the situation where
the pollution tax is chosen. The first-order conditions are




may be written as τ
x=Flxl+(-V2)/λ . Everything being equal, an increase in λ (the decisive
individual’s marginal utility of lump-sum income at the optimum) reduces the pollution tax.
Environmental policy comes at the expense of production possibilities. This tends to make
poorer individuals (with lower marginal rate of substitution between environment and private
5 The elected individual would choose policy so as to maximise her own utility. This policy would be a function
of the type of the individual, say γ
*. Substituting this policy into any other individual’s utility function one
obtains an indirect utility function of γ
* only. It is clear, since individuals differ only in one dimension, the
political equilibrium would be of the median-voter type. This is a political equilibrium if individuals’ indirect
utilities over γ
* are single peaked. This is modelled in Marsiliani and Renström, 2000b, for specific utility and
production functions.
6consumption) wanting a lower pollution tax. Furthermore, λ is also evaluated at equilibrium
production.
The argument put forth above is just to illustrate what we believe are the driving forces.
We need to prove that λ is larger for a poorer individual if she was to choose policy than it
would be for a richer individual if the latter were to choose policy. We also need to take into
account how individuals evaluate the environment. If V is not additively separable, then V2
depends on the private consumption of the decisive individual (at the optimum) as well. For
example, it could be the case that a poorer individual values the environment more (for
example, -V2 could be larger for poorer individuals). Furthermore, there is also an effect (in
case (III)) regarding the return to labour of the young generation, which the present decisive
individual does not care about, but would rather use the tax system so as to reduce the next
generation’s labour income. In order to formally prove the link between the income of the
decisive individual and environmental protection, we need to take into account the whole
system (16)-(18). We will do so by performing comparative statics, by changing γ
i of the
decision maker, and evaluating the consequences on τ
x in a situation with no inequality. We
can then see the consequences of making the decision maker (marginally) poorer or richer
than average.
Combining (16) and (17) gives
In the RHS of (19), the second expression in round brackets is unambiguously positive
(19)
because k is very close to k
i (from equations (8) and (9)). We need to evaluate the first term
in round brackets in the RHS of (19). First, in case (I) and (II), Flk is zero (production
technology (4a)). Then the capital tax is positive (zero/negative) if the decisive individual
supplies less (equal/more) of k than the average.
6 In case (II), the future generation will earn
wage income, and by choosing a larger capital tax, labour income is reduced (if Flk>0) and
an implicit transfer from the future young is accomplished. Thus, here, even if the decisive
individual owns capital exactly equal to the average (e.g., if full equality), capital would be
taxed. Equation (19) forms an implicit function in γ
i, p, k, and x (the latter two being
functions of policy). Differentiating and evaluating at k
i=k (full equality) gives
6 If Engel curves are linear, and period-two consumption normal, this is the case if the individual has γ smaller
(equal/greater) than unity (i.e., average).






Equation (21) gives the after-tax return p as a function of the decisive individual’s endowment
w0
i, of the pollution tax τ
x, and of the level of k (in turn a function of p and τ
x). If we
consider cases (I) and (II), (production technology (4a)), σ =0. Then for each level of τ
x, the
after tax return p is increasing in w0
i if commodity 2 is a normal good. If factor k’s marginal
product increases with pollution (Fkx>0) η >0, then an increase in τ
x (everything else equal)
reduces p. The reason is that an increase in τ
x reduces x and thereby reduces Fk, and it is not
optimal to reduce the tax on k so as to leave p=(1-τ
k)Fk unaffected.
Next, we combine (17) and (18) to obtain the optimality condition for τ
x
We need to know how the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and the
(24)
environment changes with the underlying variables. Let Vj denote the derivative of V with
respect to argument j={1,2}, we then have
differentiating (14) gives
(25)
using (19) and evaluating at k
i=k gives
(26)
where the last inequality follows from (18), evaluated at no inequality (i.e. λ =V1u2).
(27)





Equation (30) is a quadratic form in the Hessian of V and is negative since V is strictly
(30)
concave. Equation (29) gives the change in the individual’s marginal rate of substitution
between the private consumption index, u, and the environment. If the environment is a
normal consumption good, the first term on the right-hand side is negative, implying, at the
optimum, that a richer individual has a lower marginal rate of substitution and thus prefers
to substitute less from the environment to private consumption. This effect makes a poorer
individual wishing to protect the environment less. The second term on the right-hand side
is negative, implying that the marginal rate of substitution is decreasing in pollution (i.e.,
increasing in the environment). That is, if the level of the environment is large at the
optimum, the individual is willing to substitute less private consumption for the environment.
Finally, we need to find du2 in order to find the change in the marginal rate of substitution




˜ D is positive since u is strictly concave. From (31) we see that, at the optimum, the marginal
utility of commodity 2 is declining in the commodity-1 endowment (a richer individual has
a lower marginal utility of commodity 2 at the optimum). The rest of the terms reflect the
income effect of the tax-transfer system. An increase in the return on factor k, and in the
transfer, reduces the marginal utility of commodity 2.
Equation (13) gives dx as a function of dk and dτ
x; equation (21) gives dp as a function
of dk, dτ
x, and dw0
i. Since dk can be written as a function of dp and dx, we have a system of
three equations that gives us dk, dx, dp as functions of dτ
x and dw0
i. Substituting for those in
(29) and (31) gives d(ln[V1u2/(-V2)]) as a function of dτ
x and dw0
i (see equation (43) in
Appendix). If the environment is non-inferior (i.e., V11/V1-V21/V2 ≤ 0), commodity 1 and 2
non-inferior (N1≥ 0, N2≥ 0), [and Fxk≥ 0, σ≥ 0, and η≥ 0], then the marginal rate of substitution
9between the environment and commodity-2 consumption is unambiguously decreasing in w0
i.
This implies that, at the optimum, a poorer individual will have a lower value of the
environment as compared to private commodity-2 consumption. If we analyse cases (I) and
(II) (production (4a)), then Fxk>0, σ =0, and η =x/k>0, then it is sufficient that the environment
is non-inferior, and the two private goods are non-inferior. Thus, the key is the non-inferiority
of goods.
Next, if a higher pollution tax at the optimum reduces pollution, and if the marginal rate
of substitution is non-decreasing in the pollution tax, a richer individual prefers a higher
pollution tax. If commodity 1 is non-inferior and σ≥ 0 and η≥ 0, then the marginal-rate of
substitution is increasing in the pollution tax (by inspection of the second term in (43) in the
Appendix). Again the non-inferiority of commodities plays a role. A richer individual
typically wishes a higher environmental tax if she is decisive. The following propositions state
sufficient conditions.
Proposition 1 Assume A1-A5 and F=F(k,x)( i.e., case (I) or (II)), then sufficient for an
individual marginally poorer (richer) than average (in a situation in which all individuals are
the same) to prefer a lower (higher) pollution tax is that
(i) the environment is non-inferior (i.e., V11/V1-V21/V2 ≤ 0),
(ii) private commodities 1 and 2 are non-inferior (i.e., N1≥ 0 and N2≥ 0).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 Assume A1-A5 and F=F(k,x,l)( i.e. case (III)), then sufficient for an individual
marginally poorer (richer) than average (in a situation where all individuals are the same)
to prefer a lower (higher) pollution tax is that
(i) the environment is non-inferior (i.e., V11/V1-V21/V2 ≤ 0),
(ii) private commodities 1 and 2 are non-inferior (i.e., N1≥ 0 and N2≥ 0).
(iii) u12 ≤ 0, (iv) Fxk ≥ 0, (v) Flxkl - FlxllF xk/Fxx ≥ 0
(vi) 1 - Fxlll/Fxx ≥ 0, (vii) Fxk - Flxkl ≥ 0, (viii) -Fkk+Flkll ≥ 0
Proof: See Appendix.
There are a number of technology assumptions which are sufficient (though not necessary)
for a richer individual wanting a higher pollution tax in case (III), (but not in cases (I) and
10(II)). The reason is that an individual here wishes to redistribute from factor l, that is the
labour supply by the future young generation, and the available instruments would be set so
as to achieve that.
We have now identified the forces at work in a link between inequality and
environmental protection. First, it is the period-1 endowment of the decisive individual in
relation to the average. Thus, it is inequality in terms of skewness. Second, the non-inferiority
of both environmental and private commodities plays a role.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have found a negative relationship between income inequality (in terms of the distance
between the decisive individual and the mean individual) and the stringency of environmental
policy (the level of an environmental tax). Sufficient for this result is that consumption goods
and the environment are non-inferior.
However, we can only determine this result with general preferences and technologies
for marginal changes in skewness from a position of full equality. Extending it globally
generally makes the problem intractable. The reason is that when analysing the problem for
general inequality, two things may happen.
First, with or without government taxes, the competitive equilibrium may be a function
of the distribution. This occurs if Engel curves are non-linear. If one changes the median-
mean distance of the distribution, not only the decisive individual’s identity changes, but also
the competitive equilibrium prices. It is then difficult to assess the political channel.
7
The second consequence may be that decisions are not monotone in the individual’s type,
and single-peakedness may be violated. Then we may fail to have a median-voter equilibrium.
We would then have to look for political institutions that can overcome that problem. That
is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and it is left for future research.
7 In general it is desirable to analyse a situation where the competitive equilibrium is invariant with respect to
the underlying distribution and only the political channel is at work. This is the case when the individual utility
function is such that aggregation occurs. There is a broad class of preferences which allows for that. A special
case occurs when utility is additively separable and homothetic (logarithmic), which are the preferences restricted
to in Marsiliani and Renström (2000b).
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or by using (7)-(9), and N1+N2=1,
(34)
Using (10)-(11) gives (31).
(35)
Proof of Propositions 1-2





where the last equality follows from (8)-(9). Then, by using the last equality in (27), and the
(38)
definition (37), we have







13Substituting (40) and (41) into (36) gives
(42)
Next differentiating the log of the numerator and the denominator of the right-hand side of
(43)
(24) gives, respectively
Next, combining (43), (44), and (45), the differential of the log of (24) is
(44)
(45)
We have used the relation
(46)
(47)
14We need to evaluate the last term in (46). Using (40) and (41) in (39) gives
Since Flxk≥ 0, dk enters with negative sign in (46), and since Flxl≤ 0, dx enters with positive
(48)
sign. dk and dx are positively and negatively related, respectively, to dw
i. Therefore, the last
term will add dw
i negatively, and the function (46) is unambiguously negative in dw
i. The
terms in τ
x are at first sight ambiguous, and we have to add those terms carefully.
where
(49)




Then Propositions 1 and 2 follow from (50), (51), and (52). QED
(52)
15